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Over the past twenty years, U.S. import prices have become less responsive to the
exchange rate. We propose that this decline is a result of increased trade integration. To
illustrate this e®ect, we develop an open economy DGE model in which there is strategic
complementarity in price setting so that a ¯rm's pricing decision depends on the prices
set by its competitors. Because of the complementarity in price setting, a foreign exporter
¯nds it optimal to vary its markup over cost in response to shocks that change the exchange
rate, which insulates import prices from exchange rate movements. With increased trade
integration, exporters have become more responsive to the prices of their competitors and
this change in pricing behavior accounts for a signi¯cant portion of the observed decline
in the sensitivity of U.S import prices to the exchange rate. Our environment of low
pass-through also has important implications for the welfare bene¯ts of trade integration:
we ¯nd that the bene¯ts are substantially reduced compared to an environment with
complete pass-through.
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11 Introduction
An important factor in°uencing the transmission of external shocks to the domestic economy is
the responsiveness of import prices to exchange-rate movements. To the extent that exchange-
rate pass-through is high, exchange-rate movements will be accompanied by similar changes
in import prices, inducing relatively large movements in trade °ows and consumer prices. As
a consequence, pass-through can be particularly relevant to monetary policymakers seeking to
maintain a low and stable rate of in°ation.
What is the extent of exchange-rate pass-through to import prices (pass-through herein)?
Summarizing empirical results from research on pass-through in the 1980s, Goldberg and Knet-
ter (1997) report a range of pass-through estimates between 50 and 60 percent for the United
States. Such estimates imply that, following a 10 percent depreciation of the dollar, a foreign
exporter selling to the U.S. market would raise its price in the United States by 5-6 percent,
absorbing the remainder of the dollar depreciation via lower markups. Recent evidence by
Campa and Goldberg (2004) documents that pass-through to U.S. import prices is even lower
ranging between 25 and 40 percent. Olivei (2002) and Marazzi, Sheets, and Vigfusson (2005)
report that pass-through has fallen considerably since the early 1990s. Although roughly 50
percent in the 1980s, they estimate that pass-through is signi¯cantly lower today and centers
around 20-25 percent. Over a similar sample period, Ihrig, Marazzi, and Rothenberg (2005)
document a fall in pass-through in the other G-7 economies, and Otani, Shiratsuka, and Shirota
(2003) ¯nd a large decline in pass-through in Japan.
Di®erent explanations have been advanced to account for the fall in pass-through. Taylor
(2000) proposes that improved monetary policy performance underlies this decline. Campa
and Goldberg (2004), on the other hand, estimate that it is partly due to a change in the
composition of imports towards manufactured products. In this paper, we develop a new
approach by linking the fall in pass-through to an increase in trade integration spurred by
lower tari®s, transport costs, and increases in productivity. Our environment broadly captures
the view that pass-through has fallen because of increased foreign competition. To support our
theoretical ¯ndings, we also provide empirical evidence linking the fall in pass-through to lower
2trade costs. Using industry speci¯c measures of pass-through and trade costs, we show that
industries in which the decline in trade costs has been relatively large have also experienced
relatively large declines in pass-through.
We model incomplete pass-through building on the work of Kimball (1995) and more
recently, Dotsey and King (2005). These papers allow for strategic complementarity in price
setting using demand curves for which (the absolute value) of the demand elasticity is increasing
in a ¯rm's price relative to the price of its competitors.1 This feature implies that a ¯rm's pricing
decisions depend not only on its marginal cost but also on the prices of its competitors. Because
a foreign exporter does not want its price to deviate too far from its competitors, it is optimal
for the exporter to increase its markup in response to a dollar appreciation that lowers its costs
in dollars. Accordingly, pass-through of exchange-rate changes to import prices is incomplete
in an environment with strategic complementarity in price setting.
It is well known that models with strategic complementarity have incomplete pass-
through. Our main contribution is to show that, in a model with strategic complementarity,
lower trade costs reduce pass-through. In such a model, lower trade costs improve the relative
competitiveness of a foreign exporter in the domestic market { allowing the foreign ¯rm to
increase its relative markup over costs.2 With strategic complementarity, the foreign exporter's
price becomes more responsive to the prices of its competitors as its markup increases, and the
¯rm ¯nds it optimal to vary its markup more and its price less in response to an exchange rate
movement, i.e., lower pass-through. In our model, strategic complementarity thus induces an
exporter to set a relatively high and variable markup when its costs are lower than its com-
1We follow Woodford (2003) and de¯ne pricing decisions to be strategic complements if an increase in the
prices charged for other goods increases a ¯rm's own optimal price. For a similar approach to modelling the
strategic complementarity in an open economy, see Bergin and Feenstra (2001). The strategic complementarity
in price setting also arises in models with monopolistic competition and distribution services such as Corsetti and
Dedola (2005) and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2005). In these models, an increase in the price of nontradeables
induces a ¯rm in the tradeable sector to increase its price. For a game-theoretic approach, see, for example,
Atkeson and Burstein (2005) or Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston (2002).
2In contrast, markups would be constant for a CES demand curves where there is no strategic complemen-
tarity.
3petitors and a low and unresponsive markup when its costs are relatively high. We show that
this mechanism has a signi¯cant impact on the pricing behavior of exporting ¯rms. In our
benchmark calibration, trade integration accounts for about 40 percent of the observed decline
in pass-through since the early 1990s.
Low pass-through also has important implications for the welfare bene¯ts of trade inte-
gration. We ¯nd that the welfare bene¯ts of trade integration are substantially lower than an
environment with complete pass-through. By lowering trade costs, trade integration directly
raises welfare. However, given the strategic complementarity, foreign exporters raise their
markups and pass less of the reduction in costs to domestic consumers. These higher markups
by reducing the increase in trade can substantially reduce the bene¯ts of trade integration to
the domestic economy.
Finally, our model implies that trade integration induces an economy to become more
competitive. Because lower trade costs reduce the prices of foreign exports relative to domestic
producers, domestic producers lose market share. Strategic complementarity in price setting
induces these producers to reduce their markups in response to the decline in the prices of
foreign exporters.3 The approach developed in this paper is thus in line with the view that
trade integration has reduced the market power of domestic producers in developed economies
and squeezed their pro¯t margins.
2 U.S. Import Prices and the Real Exchange Rate
We ¯rst examine the statistical relationship between import prices and the exchange rate and
the increasing disconnect between these variables.
In our analysis, we focus on imports that are included in the end-use categories of auto-
motive products, consumer goods, and capital goods, excluding computers and semiconductors.
We will refer to these categories as ¯nished goods, which roughly account for 45 percent of the
3This result is consistent with the evidence of Chen, Imbs, and Scott (2004) who estimate that markups have
fallen in the European Union since 1990.
4nominal value of total imports since 1987.
We concentrate on this more narrowly de¯ned measure of import prices for two reasons.
First, we exclude import prices of services, computers, and semiconductors because of concerns
about price measurement. Prices for services are notoriously hard to measure. In addition,
over time, di®erent kinds of services have been added to the measured series and thus their
composition is particularly unstable. We also exclude computers and semiconductors since their
hedonic prices are heavily in°uenced by rapid increases in technology.
Second, our preferred measure excludes import prices of foods, feeds, beverages, and
industrial supplies, because we view our model as less applicable to these categories.4 In par-
ticular, we model the determination of import prices as arising from the decisions of ¯rms that
are monopolistic competitors and have the ability to price discriminate across countries. In the
context of our model, excluding these goods is sensible since many of these goods are homoge-
neous and are traded on organized exchanges, so that the extent of monopolistic behavior and
price discrimination is limited.
We argue that the decline in pass-through can be understood using a real model and
thus focus on real import prices and real exchange rates. Accordingly, we de¯ne the real price
of imports as the ratio of the ¯nished goods import price de°ator to the U.S. CPI de°ator.
Henceforth we will refer to our relative price index of ¯nished goods as the relative price of
imports. For our measure of the real exchange rate, we use the Federal Reserve's real e®ective
exchange rate, which is constructed from data on nominal exchange rates and consumer price
indices for 39 countries.
The top panel of Figure 1 plots the relative price of imports and the real exchange rate
(as the inverse of the Federal Reserve's real e®ective exchange rate) so that a rise in the real
exchange rate denotes a real depreciation of the dollar. Our relative import price index has
fallen over time, re°ecting in part that goods' prices have declined relative to the prices of
services. To abstract from this trend, the solid line shows the ratio of the price of imported
4Industrial supplies include oil, natural gas, non-fuel primary commodities, such as copper, and more
processed items, such as chemicals.
5goods to a consumption price index that excludes services.5 Using this series, it is apparent
that real import prices and the real exchange rate in the 1980-2004 period have tended to move
closely together, although movements in import prices tend to be dampened relative to the
exchange rate. This series also suggests that in the 1990s movements in relative import prices
have become more disconnected from movements in real exchange rates. Import prices rose in
the 1970s with the dollar's depreciation and also rose sharply in the late 1980s with the large
dollar depreciation beginning in 1985. In contrast, import price movements have been much
more subdued in the 1990s: even though the dollar depreciated in the early 1990s and then
appreciated in the latter half of the decade, import prices remained relatively unchanged.
Although the levels data are useful in examining trends in relative import prices and the
real exchange rate, our emphasis is on understanding the relationship between these series at
business cycle frequencies. Accordingly, the middle panel of Figure 1 plots the relative price
of imports and the real exchange rate after HP-¯ltering these series. The same basic pattern
emerges for the HP-¯ltered data: relative import prices and the real exchange rate are highly
correlated and import prices tend to be less volatile than exchange rates. Moreover, °uctuations
in import prices have moderated relative to exchange rate °uctuations since the early 1990s.
Table 1 summarizes these ¯ndings by comparing the volatility and correlation of the
relative import price and the real exchange rate over di®erent subsamples. The top panel
shows the results for the data in di®erences and the bottom panel for the HP-¯ltered data.
Both the HP-¯ltered and di®erenced data show a marked decline in the ratio of the standard
deviation of import prices, ¾pm, to the standard deviation of the exchange rate, ¾q, in the latter
half of our sample. The correlation of the relative import price with the real exchange rate has
declined noticeably as well for both the HP-¯ltered and di®erenced data.









where pm denotes the relative price of imports and q denotes the real exchange rate. This
5We use NIPA data to apply standard chain-aggregation routines to construct both our de°ator for imported
¯nished goods and our de°ator of U.S. consumption goods that excludes services.
6statistic takes into account the correlation between the two series as well as their relative
volatility and can be derived as the estimate from a univariate least squares regression of the
real exchange rate on the relative import price. As shown in Table 1, our estimate of ¯pm;q has
declined in the 1990s both for the HP-¯ltered and di®erenced data, re°ecting both the decline
in the relative volatility of import prices and the lower correlation between the two series. We
view the decline in ¯pm;q as a useful way of summarizing the increasing disconnect between the
relative import price and the real exchange rate.
Our summary statistic, ¯pm;q, is closely related to estimates of pass-through in empirical
studies. One notable di®erence is that these studies typically estimate a speci¯cation for import
prices with the exchange rate as one of a number of other factors in°uencing import prices.
An important paper from our perspective that follows this approach is Marazzi, Sheets, and
Vigfusson (2005), who argue that pass-through of exchange rate changes to import prices has
fallen from about 0.5 in the 1980s to a current estimate of 0.2. It is interesting to note that
despite the di®erent approach taken here, we get comparable estimates regarding the change
in the relationship between import prices and the exchange rate.
Further evidence of the increasing disconnect between these variable is shown in the
bottom panel of Figure 1 which plots estimates of ¯pm;q for the HP-¯ltered data based on 10-
year, rolling windows (The line with stars indicates the point estimate and the shaded region
denotes the 95 percent con¯dence region.) There is a sharp drop in ¯pm;q occurring around 1990,
as the 1980s leave the sample. We also found evidence of a structural break in the relationship
between import prices and the real exchange rate using the supremum F-test of Andrews.6
In particular, based on this methodology and using HP-¯ltered data, there is a statistically
signi¯cant break in the relationship between relative import prices and the real exchange rate
6For a given K, we de¯ned the following regression:
pt = ¯1qt + ¯2dK
t qt + ut;
where dK
t is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 0 if t < K and 1 if K · t. De¯ning K over the
recommended range suggested by Andrews, we computed the supremum of the F-tests of the signi¯cance of ¯2
and compared it against the critical values of Andrews.
7that occurs in 1989q2.
For further evidence regarding the relationship between import prices and the exchange
rate, we also examined more disaggregated data. For industry i, the upper left panel of Figure
2 reports our summary statistics, ¯i
pm;q, using data in log-di®erences on prices for each of 16
¯nished goods industries (two digit SITC) and our real exchange rate measure de¯ned earlier.
This statistic is computed for two sample periods: pre- and post-1990. As can be seen in the
upper left panel of Figure 2, most industries have seen a sizeable decline in ¯i
pm;q. Taking a
simple average across industries, the mean value of ¯i
pm;q declined almost 30 percentage points,
from an industry-average value of 0.48 pre-1990 to a value of 0.19 post-1990.
Overall, the evidence suggests that there has been an increasing disconnect between the
price of imported ¯nished goods and the exchange rate. We now turn to documenting the
decline in trade costs and the rise in productivity outside the United States, which we argue
are two important factors underlying the decline in pass-through.
3 Trade Costs and Productivity
Barriers to international trade take many forms, some less tangible than others. Typically, tar-
i®s and transport costs come to mind as factors impeding the free °ow of goods across countries.
However, international trade can also be hindered by the presence of legal and regulatory costs,
distribution costs, and institutional and cultural barriers. Although tari®s and transport costs
have the advantage of being relatively easier to quantify, it is more di±cult to precisely measure
other forms of trade costs, since they are often not directly observable. As a result, researchers
infer these costs by estimating gravity models of international trade.7 This literature ¯nds
mixed evidence regarding a possible decline in overall trade costs. Using di®erent datasets and
methodologies, Rauch (1999), Coe, Subramanian, Tamirisa, and Bhavnani (2002), and Brun,
Carrere, Guillaumont, and de Melo (2002) ¯nd that trade costs have fallen continuously since
the 1970s. On the other hand, Frankel (1997) and Berthelon and Freund (2004) ¯nd no evidence
7See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) for a survey of gravity models.
8of a signi¯cant decline in trade costs.
The evidence regarding the fall in tari®s and transport costs is more conclusive. For the
Unites States, we calculate changes in tari®s and transport costs using highly disaggregated
import data (see Feenstra 1996 and 2002 for details). For each available ¯nished-goods industry,
we measure these costs as the share of freight expenditure and duties paid in terms of customs
value of the goods (which is the value on which duties are assessed). We then compute an
average trade cost measure by weighting an industry's trade cost measure by that industry's
share of total customs value of ¯nished goods. The upper right panel of Figure 2 reports that,
between 1980 and 2001, the average trade costs across industries fell from 16 percent of the
custom value of the goods to 9 percent.8
We now report additional evidence on the global fall in tari®s and transport costs. Tables
2 and 3 show that the decline in tari® rates initiated in the 1950s has continued over the
last 25 years in both developed and developing economies. The average weighted tari®s, in
developed economies, applied to products coming from the rest of the world declined roughly
three percentage points since the late 1980s. Moreover, a more pronounced decline occurred
in developing economies over approximately the same period. Overall, tari®s in developing
economies fell 11 percentage points and more than 20 percentage point in South American
economies.
Alternative measures of transport costs also tend to show a decline. Transport costs are
often measured using the fact that exporting countries measure trade °ows exclusive of freight
and insurance (fob), while importing countries measure °ows inclusive of freight and insurance
(cif ). Comparing the valuation of the same aggregate °ow reported by the importer and the
exporter provides a measure of transport costs.9 Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2003) use this
8There are a few caveats to these numbers. First, these calculations are the realized average trade cost rather
than the marginal trade cost. An increase of imports from a distant country may lead to higher average trade
cost even though the cost of importing from that distant country may not have changed. Second, failing to
control for possible quality improvements may bias the measure of trade costs.
9This measure should be interpreted with some caution. In addition to changes in transport costs, di®erences
in valuations may change because of other factors, such as improved reporting by exporters.
9strategy to study the impact of falling trade costs on industry productivity in the United States.
Of the U.S. industries they examine, 44 percent experienced a decline in transport costs between
1982 and 1987, while the percentage rose to 66 percent for the period 1987-1992. Similarly,
Hummels (1999) ¯nds that ocean freight rates have declined steadily since the mid-1980s, in part
because of the introduction of containerization in ocean transport, which increased shipping
e±ciency.10 Hummels (1999) also ¯nds a steady decline in air freight rates since the 1970s.
Although tari®s and transport costs make up only a fraction of overall trade costs, they
remain an important factor underlying the movement towards greater trade integration. For
instance, Baier and Bergstrand (2001) ¯nd that the decline in tari® rates and transport costs
(measured using fob and cif trade data) played an important role in post-World-War-II ex-
pansion in international trade. They estimate that, between the late 1950s and the late 1980s,
tari®-reductions and declining transport costs explain respectively 25 percent and 8 percent of
the growth in world trade.
In sum, our reading of the literature suggests that trade costs have continued to fall in
the past twenty-¯ve years. Although the gravity models are inconclusive with respect to the
magnitude of the decline in overall trade barriers, more tangible measures of trade costs { tari®
rates and transport costs { have clearly declined over the past twenty-¯ve years.
Since trade integration can also be triggered by improved productivity of exporting ¯rms,
we consider changes in relative productivities across countries. The top panel of Figure 3
displays the annualized percentage change in GDP per employee for the United States (`US'),
its foreign counterpart (`ROW'), and other regions around the world for the 1980-2003 period.11
These indices are constructed using data on GDP per employee, and the ROW index is based
on data for OECD and major developing countries.12 Growth in GDP per employee outside
10Although containerization was introduced in the 1960s, ocean freight rates started to decline only in the
mid-1980s. Hummels (1999) argues that the increase in rates in the 1970s and early 1980s were driven in part by
adverse cost shocks. Moreover, containerization on shipping routes to and from developing countries occurred
primarily after 1980.
11Although we would prefer a more disaggregated measure, we focus on productivity at the aggregate level
due to data limitations for developing countries.
12The productivity indices are constructed using GDP in 1990 U.S. dollars at purchasing power parity. We
10the United States outpaced U.S. growth largely due to faster productivity growth in developing
Asia (`DA'), which includes a number of rapidly-developing countries such as China and South
Korea. Productivity growth in Europe (`EU') was roughly on par with growth in the United
States, while Japanese (`JA') productivity growth was somewhat faster than in the United
States, despite a marked deceleration in Japanese productivity in the 1990s.
With foreign labor productivity growth higher than U.S. productivity growth over the
last two decades, there has been considerable convergence of foreign productivity to the level
of U.S. productivity. The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows that GDP per employee outside
the United States roughly doubled over the 1980-2003 period, while U.S. GDP per employee
rose about 40 percent over this period. As a consequence, the level of foreign productivity has
increased by 40 percent relative to U.S. productivity over the past twenty-¯ve years.13
4 The Model
Our model consists of a home and a foreign economy. These two economies have isomorphic
structures so in our exposition we focus on describing only the domestic economy. The domestic
economy consists of two types of agents: households and ¯rms. Households have utility that
depends on the consumption of both domestically-produced goods and imported goods. These
goods are purchased from monopolistically competitive ¯rms, who sell their goods to both
domestic and foreign households. The key element we introduce into this environment is that a
¯rm's demand curve has a non-constant elasticity so that exchange-rate pass-through to import
prices may be incomplete.
de¯ne labor productivity based on GDP per employee rather than GDP per hour, since the former index allows
for greater country coverage. This aggregate is constructed using data on Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, China, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. All data are from the Groningen
Growth and Development Centre (http://www.ggdc.net).
13We arrived a slightly larger di®erential using GDP per hour worked and fewer countries for our foreign
aggregate.
114.1 Households











where the discount factor ¯ satis¯es 0 < ¯ < 1 and Et is the expectation operator conditional
on information available at time t. The period utility function depends on consumption Ct and
labor Lt. A household also purchases state-contingent assets bt+1 that are traded internationally
so that asset markets are complete.14
Household's receive income from working and an aliquot share of pro¯ts of all the domestic
¯rms, ­t. In choosing its contingency plans for Ct, Lt, bt, a household takes into account its




pbt;t+1bt+1 ¡ bt = wtLt + ­t: (3)
In equation (3), pbt;t+1 denotes the price of an asset that pays one unit of the domestic con-
sumption good in a particular state of nature at date t+1 (For convenience, we have suppressed
that variables depend on the state of nature.)
4.2 Demand Aggregator
Household consumption is made up of a continuum of domestically-produced goods, Cdt(i),
indexed by i 2 [0;1], and a continuum of imported goods, Cmt(j), j 2 [0;!]. Household choose
















= 1. In the above, the parameter, !, may be interpreted as
determining the degree of home bias in a household's consumption expenditures, as we assume
14We discuss the incomplete markets case below in our sensitivity analysis.
12that domestic household's purchase a greater variety of home goods than foreign goods since

































and Vmt is a similarly de¯ned aggregator for imported goods except that its limits of integration
are 0 and !.
Our demand aggregator adapts the one discussed in Dotsey and King (2005) to an inter-
national environment. It shares the central feature that the elasticity of demand is nonconstant
with ´ 6= 0, and the (absolute value of the) demand elasticity can be expressed as an increasing
function of a ¯rm's relative price when ´ < 0:16 This feature has proven useful in the sticky price
literature, because it helps mitigate a ¯rm's incentive to raise its price after an expansionary
monetary shock in the context of a model in which other ¯rms have already preset their prices.
It is also consistent with the evidence that ¯rms tend to change their prices more in response
to cost increases than decreases (see, for instance, Peltzman (2000)). Another important im-
plication of this aggregator, more relevant for us, is that exchange-rate pass-through to import
prices will be incomplete when the elasticity of demand is increasing in a ¯rm's relative price.17
Our aggregator di®ers from Dotsey and King (2005) by aggregating over foreign goods,
and allowing for home bias in consumption expenditures. Accordingly, the aggregator of Dotsey
and King (2005) can be viewed as a special case of equations (4) and (5) with ! = 0.
15While we assume that the degree of home bias in each country is exogenous, a natural extension would
allow ! and !¤ to be endogenous variables. In that case, a change in trade costs would a®ect the number of
exporters in each market (extensive margin) in addition to the demand for a foreign exporter's good (intensive
margin).
16Alternatively, one can express the NCES demand curve as a decreasing function of a ¯rm's market share,
as in Kimball (1995). See Woodford (2003) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) who also pursue this approach.
17See, for example, Bergin and Feenstra (2001) who demonstrate that the interaction of their NCES demand
curve with sticky prices-local currency pricing is useful in accounting for the observed volatility and persistence
of the exchange rate.
13Expenditure minimization by a domestic household implies that demand for import good
































According to equation (7), the demand curve is the sum of a Dixit-Stiglitz term and a linear
term in which the parameters ° and ´ govern the elasticity and curvature of the demand curve.
Expenditure minimization also implies a similar expression for the demand of Cdt(i) expressed
as a function of
Pdt(i)
¡t .















From this expression, it is clear that the consumer price level is equal to the competitive pricing
bundle, ¡t, when ´ = 0. In general, the consumer price level is the sum of ¡t with a linear
aggregator of prices for individual goods.18
4.3 Firms
The production function for ¯rm i is linear in labor so that
Yt(i) = ZtLt(i): (10)
In the above, Zt is an aggregate technology shock that a®ects the production function for all
¯rms in the home country and evolves according to:
log(Zt) = (1 ¡ ½z)log(Z) + ½z log(Zt¡1) + ¾z²zt: (11)
18The consumer price level is derived from equating equation (4) to PtCt and substituting in the relative
demand curves. The price ¡t is derived from substituting the relative demand curves into equation (5).
14A ¯rm hires labor in a competitive labor market in which labor is completely mobile within a
country but immobile across countries. Marginal cost is therefore the same for all ¯rms in the





where wt is the real wage in the domestic economy.
Firms in each country are monopolistically competitive and each ¯rm sells their good to
households located in their country. Consistent with our assumption about home bias, only a
fraction of ¯rms sell their goods to households located in the other country. Speci¯cally, ¯rms
indexed by i 2 [0;!¤], where !¤ denotes the home-bias parameter of the foreign country, sell
their goods both in the home and foreign country, while the remaining fraction of ¯rms sell
their goods only in the home market (We use an asterisk to denote a variable in the foreign
country).
A ¯rm chooses to set its price as a markup over marginal cost, taking the demand curve



































We restrict our attention to a symmetric equilibrium in which all domestic ¯rms set the same
price in the domestic market so that Pdt(i) = Pdt; ²dt(i) = ²dt; and ¹dt(i) = ¹dt.
Equation (14) shows that ¯rm i's markup depends on the price it sets relative to its
competitors price ¡t. When the (absolute value of) the demand elasticity is increasing in
Pdt(i)
¡t ,
15the markup will be a decreasing function of this relative price. Consequently, a ¯rm will respond
to a fall in the price of its competitors by lowering its price and accepting a lower markup. A
¯rm ¯nds it desirable to do so, because otherwise it will experience a large fall in its market
share. An important exception to this pricing behavior is the CES demand curve in which
´ = 0. In this case, ¯rm i does not experience a fall in demand when ¡t decreases and therefore
decides to leave its markup unchanged.
We view our setup with variable markups as a tractable way to capture the strategic
complementarity amongst price-setting ¯rms. Although we do not explicitly model strategic
behavior using a game-theoretic framework, our setup has similar implications to those of
Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston (2002) and Atkeson and Burstein (2005) who model the strategic
complementarity that arises between ¯rms through Cournot or Bertrand competition and show
that exchange-rate pass-through is incomplete. Their setup, like ours, also give rise to a markup
that is increasing in a ¯rm's market share or decreasing in its price relative to those of its
competitors.
While all domestic ¯rms set their price according to equation (13), some of these ¯rms
also choose a price for the foreign market. For these ¯rms, we assume that they incur an iceberg
shipping cost Dt, which evolves according to:
log(Dt) = (1 ¡ ½d)log(D) + ½d log(Dt¡1) + ¾d²dt: (16)
Accordingly, the real marginal costs inclusive of the shipping cost for a domestic exporter is












mt(i) ¸ 1, P ¤
mt(i) denotes the foreign currency price of good i and qt denotes the
real exchange rate expressed in units of the home consumption bundle per units of foreign
consumption.
In a symmetric equilibrium (i.e., P ¤
mt(i) = P ¤
mt), the markup of a domestic ¯rm in the






















will not hold when Dt > 1. In addition, because the demand elasticity can di®er across markets,
a ¯rm will optimally decide to price discriminate. It will be able to set di®erent markups in
the domestic and foreign markets as long as the di®erence between a ¯rm's price in the two














The ¯rst condition ensures that a foreign household can not buy the good for less in the domestic
market inclusive of the cost of shipping the good. The second condition ensures that a domestic
household can not buy the good for less abroad. Later, we show that these conditions and their
counterparts for the prices set by foreign ¯rms are satis¯ed.
4.4 Market Clearing
The home economy's aggregate resource constraint is given by:




where Yt denotes the output of all domestic ¯rms expressed on a per capita basis and n denotes
the population of the foreign economy scaled by the population of the home economy. The
foreign economy has an isomorphic structure to the home economy and di®ers only in its level
of trade costs, technology, and population size.
5 De¯ning Pass-Through
We de¯ne pass-through from the perspective of an individual exporter who views the exchange
rate as exogenous (see also Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston (2002)). It is de¯ned as how much
an individual exporter changes his price in response to a one percent change in the exchange
rate, holding constant the other factors a ¯rm takes as given: its marginal cost and the prices
of other ¯rms. Letting pmt(h) =
Pmt(j)
Pt and »t = ¡t
Pt denote the relative price of exporter j and







where ¹mt(j) is given by the foreign exporter's version of equation (14). The direct e®ect of an



























»t ). Because ·mt(j) measures only the direct e®ect of an exchange rate
change on an exporter's price, we refer to it as the direct pass-through measure.
From the above expression, we can see that if ´ < 0 so that ¹0
mt(j) < 0 then direct
pass-through will be incomplete.19 In this case, a one percent increase in qt drives up a foreign
exporter's cost when denominated in dollars; however, a ¯rm does not raise its price a full one
percent because as the exporter's price rises relative to its competitors, it induces the exporter
to accept a lower markup rather than give up market share. In contrast, in the CES case
in which ´ = 0 so that ¹0
mt(j) = 0, direct pass-through is complete, as an exporter's pricing
decision does not depend on the prices set by other ¯rms.
To facilitate comparisons of our model with the data, in addition to our direct pass-
through measure, we also examine our model's implications for the second moment ¯pm;q pre-





The relationship between ¯pm;q and ·mt(j) can be seen by log-linearizing equation (21) around
the non-stochastic steady state to write a foreign exporter's pricing decision as:




t + ^ Ã
¤
t + ^ qt
´
+ (1 ¡ ·m) ^ »t: (24)
19With ´ < 0; the demand curve is less convex than the CES case.
18The symbol `^' denotes the log-deviation of a variable from its steady state value and ·m = ·m(j)
evaluated at nonstochastic steady state. Using this equation, we can relate ¯q;pm and ·m via:














According to equation (25), the univariate regression statistic, ¯pm;q, is related to ·m except that
¯pm;q takes into account any correlation of the real exchange rate with an exporter's costs and
the pricing index of an exporter's competitors that occurs in general equilibrium. Thus, ¯pm;q
takes into account both direct and indirect e®ects of an exchange rate change on an exporter's
price.
In our analysis, we focus on comparing our model results to the data for ¯pm;q rather than
·m. This re°ects that ¯pm;q is a second moment that is easily measured in the data. In contrast,
measuring ·m is complicated by ¯nding good measures of marginal costs and the prices of a
¯rm's competitors as well as correctly specifying the equations for estimating ·m and dealing
with the endogeneity of the exchange rate and the prices of other ¯rms.
6 Calibration
In order to investigate the role of trade costs and productivity di®erentials on pass-through,
we log-linearize and solve the model for two di®erent cases. In the ¯rst case, the steady state
trade costs, D and D¤, are high and the level of productivity in the United States is higher
than in the rest of the world. We call this the strategic complementarity (SC) calibration. In
the second case, trade costs are low and the level of productivity in steady state is the same
in the two countries.20 We call this the 2004 SC calibration, whose only di®erences from the
SC calibration are the parameters governing the level of trade costs and productivity in each
country.
As discussed above, ´, which governs the curvature of the demand curve is a crucial
parameter for our analysis. Faced with sparse independent evidence regarding this parameter,
20While the level of foreign productivity in 2004 is lower than U.S. productivity, we focus only on the change
in relative productivity, as it is the change that is important for our results.
19we calibrate it as a part of a simulated method of moments procedure. Speci¯cally, we choose
´, ¾z = ¾¤
z, and ¾D = ¾D¤ so that the model's implications for the volatility of output, the
ratio of the volatility of relative import prices to the real exchange rate, and the correlation
between relative import prices and the real exchange rate match those observed in the 1980-
1989 period. By construction, our model therefore matches the observed value of ¯pm;q; our
benchmark measure of pass-through, for the 1980s. With ´ pinned down based on the pre-1990s
data, we then examine and compare the fall in ¯pm;q arising from falling trade costs and rising
foreign productivity to the observed fall in the data.
Tables 4 and 5 show our calibrated value of ´ as well as the calibrated values of other
important parameters of the model. For the other parameter governing the demand curve, °,
we choose a value so that the price markup ¹d ¡ 1 is about 20 percent in the non-stochastic
steady state of the SC calibration. With D¤ > 1, the markup set by foreign ¯rms in the
domestic market is even smaller, as ¹m ¡ 1 is about 10 percent. Since this has the implication
that the elasticity of import demand with respect to the relative price of imports is above 10,
later in our sensitivity analysis we consider an alternative calibration with a lower trade-price
elasticity.
We calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency so that ¯ = 1:03¡0:25. The utility
function parameter Â is set to 1.5 so as to imply a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 2/3, an
elasticity well within the range of most empirical estimates.21 We choose Â0 and Â¤
0 so that
L = L¤ = 1 in the SC calibration.
The model is calibrated so that the two economies are identical except for country size.
The parameter ! = !¤ is chosen so that model matches the import to GDP ratio in the United
States in the early 1980s of about 10 percent. We choose the relative population sizes of the
two countries so that the United States comprises about 33 percent of world output. Since we
choose an initial level of assets that is consistent with balanced trade in the steady state of the
SC calibration, the import share of output of the foreign economy is about 5 percent.
We calibrate our model to be consistent with the change in relative productivity and trade
21See, for example, Pencavel (1986), Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), and Pencavel (2002).
20costs observed over the 1980-2004 period. As discussed above, the level of foreign productivity
is about 40 percent higher vis-µ a-vis U.S. productivity in 2004 than in 1980. We choose a more
conservative 30 percent increase in the level of foreign to U.S. productivity. In particular, we
normalized Z = 1 in both the SC and 2004 SC calibrations and set Z¤ = 0:7143 in the SC
calibration and Z¤ = 0:9289 in the 2004 SC calibration.
For our benchmark case, we set the decline in D and D¤ to 7 percentage points, consistent
with the evidence presented in the upper right panel of Figure 2 and discussed in Section3.22
However, since this estimate is potentially fraught with uncertainty, we also consider alternative
calibrations for the decline in trade costs in our sensitivity analysis. In all of these cases, we
set D = D¤ = 1:25 for the initial level of trade costs.
Table 6 compares selected moments for our benchmark SC calibration to the data as
well as a calibration with CES demand curves. For the CES calibration, we set ´ = 0 and
° = 1=1:1027. This value of ° is chosen so that the markup of a foreign exporter and thus the
demand elasticity of imports with respect to price are the same as in the SC calibration.
For both the SC and CES calibrations, the technology and trade-cost shocks in the foreign
economy are calibrated to have the same persistence and volatility as the shocks in the home
economy. Also, we set the AR(1) coe±cient for each shock equal to 0.95 and assumed that the
shocks are uncorrelated with each other.
As shown in Table 6, both the CES and SC calibration (by construction) match the
observed volatility of output and correlation between import prices and the exchange rate in
the 1980s. However, only the SC calibration with ´ 6= 0 has the °exibility to match the
observed value of ¯pm;q in the 1980s. Although the SC calibration implies slightly less exchange
rate volatility than the CES calibration, both versions of the model understate the amount of
exchange rate volatility and persistence relative to the data. Thus, while the NCES demand
22Alternatively, we also calibrated the decline in D and D¤ to be consistent with the evidence of Baier and
Bergstrand (2001) that falling trade costs accounted for one third of the growth in world trade after World War
II. More speci¯cally, we set the fall in D and D¤ such that it induces a 1.7 percentage point increase in the
U.S. import share, roughly a third of the rise in the U.S. import share observed over the 1980-2004 period. The
required fall in D and D¤ turned out to also be 7 percentage points.
21curves better account for the observed relationship between the relative import price and the
real exchange rate, they do not by themselves explain other important aspects of the data
emphasized in the international business cycle literature.
7 Results
To gain intuition for our main results, we ¯rst illustrate the implications of our setup for pass-
through in partial equilibrium. We then look at the impact of di®erent shocks for our measures
of pass-through. Finally, we report our general equilibrium ¯ndings regarding the impact of a
rise in trade integration on pass-through and consider the e®ects of trade integration on welfare
in a environment of low pass-through.
7.1 A Partial Equilibrium Explanation for Declining Pass-Through
The upper left panel of Figure 4 plots the demand curve of import good j for our SC para-
meterization of ´ and ° and compares it to a CES demand curve.23 The absolute value of the
demand elasticity for good j, j²mt(j)j, is shown in the upper right panel. Our calibrated demand
curve is consistent with strategic complementarity in price setting. The absolute value of the
elasticity is increasing in an exporter's relative price. Therefore, an exporter ¯nds it optimal
to reduce its markup rather than increase its prices, and, hence, direct pass-through, ·mt(j), is
incomplete.
Another important implication of our demand curve is that pass-through will fall with
a decline in the cost of exporting. Thus, our model will be able to account for a declining
pass-through via either a fall in trade costs or a rise in foreign productivity relative to U.S.
productivity. We now discuss the intuition for this result.
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equality does not hold in part because Dt > 1. As a result, the markup and pass-through in this example are
di®erent from the value reported in Table 5.











The lower left panel of Figure 4 displays marginal revenue (in logs and scaled by ¡t) as a function
of the relative price
Pmt(j)
¡t . As a ¯rm increases its price relative to the price of its competitors,
marginal revenue exhibits diminishing returns. At a low relative price, the demand elasticity
is also low and an increase in exporter j's relative price boosts marginal revenue because of a)
the direct e®ect of the rise in the ¯rm's price and b) the increase in the demand elasticity as
an exporter's price rises relative to its competitors. However, as the exporter's relative price
increases and the demand elasticity becomes high enough, the latter e®ect becomes negligible
and the increase in marginal revenue is limited to only the direct e®ect of the increase in price.
(As the demand elasticity approaches in¯nity, a ¯rm is essentially setting its price equal to
marginal cost.) Thus, the e®ect of strategic complementarity in price setting diminishes as the
elasticity rises, and, as displayed in the lower right panel of Figure 4, an exporter's markup is
more responsive to
Pmt(j)
¡t at a low elasticity (i.e., high markup) and less responsive to
Pmt(j)
¡t at
a high elasticity (i.e., low markup).
A consequence of the concavity of the marginal revenue schedule is that a fall in an
exporter's costs will result in a decline in direct pass-through.24 To illustrate this point, consider
the dashed blue line, labelled mcH, of the lower left panel, which shows the logarithm of
the exporter's marginal cost denominated in domestic currency units (also scaled by ¡t). At
this portion of the marginal revenue schedule, a real (exogenous) depreciation of the domestic
currency that results in a 2 percent increase in ¯rm j's marginal cost (mc0
H) only results in
about a 0.8 percent increase in a ¯rm's relative price, so that direct pass-through is roughly
24Because of this concavity, pass-through ·mt(j) is an increasing function in a ¯rm's relative price or a
decreasing function in a ¯rm's market share for our calibrated demand curve. Using data from the automobile
industry, Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter (1996) ¯nd a more complicated U-shaped relationship between pass-
through and the market share of automobile exporters. In particular, for automobile exporters with a low
market share (between 0 and 40 percent) in a destination market, pass-through falls as the exporters' market
share increases, as our model predicts. By contrast, they estimate that the opposite relationship occurs for
exporters with a higher market share.
2340 percent. Now, suppose a fall in trade costs shifts the ¯rm's marginal costs down to mcL.
In this case, a two percent real depreciation of the domestic currency increases the exporter's
costs from mcL to mc0
L and results in only about a 0.4 percent increase in relative price, so
that direct pass-through is roughly 20 percent. Pass through is lower for a low-cost producer
because a cost increase requires a smaller increase in price, since the associated rise in the
demand elasticity provides an extra boost to marginal revenue.
In comparison, under CES demand curves direct pass-through of exchange-rate changes
will be complete: A two percent home currency depreciation results in a two percent increase
in price regardless of an exporter's costs. This re°ects the fact that the demand elasticity, and
thus the markup, do not vary with a monopolist's relative price.
7.2 The E®ects of Di®erent Shocks on Pass-Through
Using impulse responses, we show that productivity and trade-cost shocks have di®erent e®ects
on our two measures of pass-through. An important di®erence between the two measures is
that ·m is independent of the economy's shocks, while ¯pm;q is not. To illustrate this, Figure 5
shows the e®ects of a one standard deviation increase in home technology for the SC calibration.
Home technology shocks induce a real depreciation of the home currency (i.e., a rise in qt) and
put upward pressure on the real marginal cost of foreign ¯rms, as foreign labor supply contracts
and real wages rise abroad. Accordingly, the correlation of Ã¤
t and qt is positive and ¯pm;q > ·m
in response to technology shocks (¯pm;q = 0:6 and ·m = 0:35).
Figure 5 also displays the e®ects of a one standard deviation increase in a foreign ex-
porter's trade cost, D¤
t. An increase in D¤
t raises the price of foreign goods for home households,
thereby lowering the demand for foreign goods on the world market and inducing a real de-
preciation of the foreign currency. With only trade cost shocks, there is a negative correlation
between D¤
t and qt, and ¯pm;q is roughly zero while ·m = 0:35.
Overall, our calibration procedure implies that the bulk of the variation in the real ex-
change rate and the relative import price are driven primarily by technology shocks. As a
consequence, the values of ¯pm;q reported in Table 6 for the SC calibration mainly re°ect the
24in°uence of technology shocks.25
7.3 Trade Integration and Declining Pass-Through
Table 7 shows the e®ects of lowering trade costs and higher foreign productivity on pass-
through and important steady state prices and quantities. The table shows the value of the
variables in steady state except for ¯pm;q, which is obtained from log-linearizing the model and
computing the population moments of the model's variables given the shock processes of the SC
calibration. We start by looking at the e®ects of changing one variable at a time (columns 2-4),
before analyzing their combined impacts (last column). As shown in the second column, a seven
percentage points fall in the trade costs of foreign exporters reduces the real cost of exporting in
home currency by 4.3 percent. Note that the fall in foreign exporters' real marginal cost, D¤Ã¤q,
is less than the decline in D¤ as increased demand for the foreign good puts upward pressure
on the real exchange rate, q, and on the marginal cost of production, Ã¤. With lower costs,
foreign exporters reduce their prices and the home country's import share rises 1.3 percentage
points. Because foreign exporters' prices falls relative to their competitors - the domestic ¯rms,
they are able to increase their markups and still gain market share. Conversely, the prices for
domestic goods rise relative to their competitors, and domestic ¯rms are forced to cut their
markups in reaction to sti®er competition from abroad.
With higher markups on foreign goods, the strategic complementarity intensi¯es and
foreign exporters become more willing to vary their markups in response to cost shocks (recall
the lower left panel of Figure 4). Thus, the 7 percentage points decline in trade costs causes
the pass-through measure ·m to fall from 0.36 to 0.332, or 2.8 percentage points. This fall in
·m also leads to a reduction in our statistical measure of pass-through, ¯pm;q, of more than 5.5
percentage points, from 0.55 to 0.495. As indicated by equation (25, reproduced below), a fall
25It is interesting to note that the cyclicality of the domestic producers' markups in the home market depends
on the source of the shock. Domestic markups are countercyclical conditional on changes in trade costs faced
by home exporters and procyclical with respect to the other shocks. The domestic markup is procyclical
unconditionally, re°ecting the importance of technology shocks. Of course, incorporating nominal rigidities in
domestic prices would imply a countercyclical markup.
25in ·m directly lowers ¯pm;q:
















Moreover, the decline in ·m implies that ¯pm;q places less weight on the marginal cost term (the
¯rst term in square brackets) and more weight on the price competitiveness term (the second
term in square brackets). The marginal cost term is larger than the price competitiveness term
because »t has little variation (See Figure 5). As a result, a fall in ·m, by shifting a ¯rm's
emphasis in pricing away from cost considerations to considerations of price competitiveness,
induces an even larger decline in ¯pm;q.
A fall in D, the trade cost on domestic goods sold to the foreign economy, also lowers pass-
through (third column of Table 7). In general equilibrium, increased foreign demand for home
goods causes an appreciation of the home currency that reduces the cost of foreign exporters
and leads to a fall in pass-through. Because of the larger size of the foreign economy, the
appreciation is substantial and results in the real cost of foreign exporters (in home currency)
falling by 1.5 percent. This decline in costs triggers a fall in foreign exporters' prices relative
to prices of domestic goods in the home market. As a result, exporters increase their markups
and prices of foreign goods decline only 0.6 percent. At these higher markups, ·m declines 1
percentage point and ¯pm;q declines 3.7 percentage points.
The fourth column of Table 7 shows the combined e®ects of lowering trade costs in the
home and foreign economies. In this case, foreign exporters' share of the domestic market
expands by 1.7 percentage points and our statistical measure of pass-through declines about 7
percentage points.
The ¯fth column of Table 7 displays the e®ects of raising the level of foreign productivity
by 30 percent. Although there is a substantial increase in foreign real wages in response to
the higher level of productivity, marginal costs in foreign currency fall. The foreign currency
also depreciates; so, an exporter's marginal cost in home currency falls almost 12 percent. This
large decline in foreign costs allows foreign exporters to both substantially reduce prices and
expand their markups at the expense of their domestic competitors. Consequently, the decline
in ¯pm;q is a sizeable 9.1 percentage points.
26The last column of Table 7 displays the decline in pass-through from the SC to the 2004
SC calibration in which the increase in foreign productivity is combined with the decline in D
and D¤. Higher productivity and lower trade costs have a substantial impact on pass-through.
Overall, ¯pm;q falls almost 16 percentage points, which accounts for about 40 percent of the ob-
served decline. The fall in pass-through occurs even though the home market is simultaneously
becoming more competitive: markups on domestic goods fall 3 percentage points following the
rise in trade integration (see Table 5 for a more detailed comparison of the properties of the
SC and 2004 SC calibrations). These results broadly capture the view that pass-through has
fallen in the United States because of increased foreign competition, which in turn has reduced
pro¯t margins of domestic producers in the U.S. market.
The positive theoretical relationship between trade costs and pass-through emphasized in
our model is broadly in line with US industry-level data since the early 1980s. In the lower left
panel of Figure 2, we relate the changes in industry-speci¯c pass-through (reported in Section
2) to the changes in industry-speci¯c trade cost (discussed in Section 3). The ¯gure indicates
that declines in trade costs are correlated with declines in pass-through. In particular, a 1
percentage point decline in trade costs is associated with a 0.8 percentage point decline in
pass-through, about the same magnitude as in our benchmark calibration. While we view this
correlation as suggestive of our theory, one important caveat is that we only have a limited
number of industries for assessing this relationship.26
Finally, we note that with producers engaging in price discrimination, a household might
¯nd it pro¯table to exploit deviations in the law of one price. However, we veri¯ed that
households have no incentive to do so because deviations from the law of one price are smaller
than the costs of trading goods across countries: for instance, in the 2004 SC calibration, the
deviations in the law of one price for the home good as measured by jpd ¡ p¤
mqj are less than 5
percent.27 Deviations from the law of one price are small because a monopolist must take into
26The limited number of industries makes the magnitude (though not the sign) sensitive to outliers. For
instance, when we remove the footware industry, the postive relationship between trade costs and pass-through
becomes stronger, with a slope coe±cient of roughly 3.
27We also checked that the counterparts to equations (19) for the foreign good also hold. In addition, these
27account the in°uence of its competitors' prices on its own price setting behavior: in the market
where its costs are low, a producer sets a high markup, while in the market where its costs are
high, it sets a low markup. Thus, the strategic complementarity in price setting acts to limit
deviations from the law of one price.
The strategic complementarity also implies that the degree of price discrimination declines
in response to a fall in trade costs. Given lower trade costs, a ¯rm increases its markup abroad
and lowers it in its own market and as such markups converge. These changes in markup,
however, do mute the degree to which prices change in response to the fall in trade costs. For
example, the 7 percentage point fall in D and D¤ only results in about a 1 percentage point
convergence in prices. This result is consistent with the evidence that notwithstanding an in-
crease in trade integration, price convergence remained muted in comparison.28 In comparison,
in the CES economy, deviations from the law of one price would decline one-for-one with the
fall in trade costs.
7.4 Trade Integration and Welfare
So far, we have documented that trade integration helps account for declining pass-through
in an environment with strategic complementarity in price setting. We now show that the
strategic complementarity in price setting has important implications for the welfare bene¯ts
of trade integration.
Table 8 reports the welfare e®ects of trade integration under alternative scenarios. In
each scenario, we calculate the home and foreign welfare gains by comparing household utility
in the initial steady state and the steady state associated with greater trade integration. The
welfare gain is expressed in consumption equivalent units as the percentage of consumption in
conditions held for all cases in Tables 7 and 9 as well as our stochastic simulations in which technology and
trade costs vary.
28See Engel and Rogers (2004) and Bergin and Glick (2005). Bergin and Glick (2005) also ¯nd puzzling
instances in which price dispersion increased over time as barriers to trade fell. They model trade along the
extensive margin to account for this observation and show that in some cases trade integration can indeed lead
to greater price dispersion. In contrast, our approach predicts that prices always converge as trade costs decline.
28the initial steady state a household would give up in order to be in a world with greater trade
integration. We also report world welfare, which weights each country's welfare according to
its population. For each scenario, we report the welfare gains for two versions of our model:
the strategic complementarity (SC) calibration and the CES calibration.
The second column of Table 8 reports the welfare gains from lowering D¤. In both the
SC and CES economies, a fall in D¤ directly raises home welfare, though by substantially
less in the SC case. This di®erence re°ects how the fall in D¤ a®ects the distortion arising
from monopolistic competition. Because the markups of foreign exporters increases in the SC
economy, a decline in D¤ leads to a less pronounced fall in import prices in the SC economy
than in the CES economy. The smaller price decline implies a smaller increase in import
consumption. The relatively lower consumption of imports in the SC economy is partially
compensated by a reduction in the markups of domestic ¯rms, which has a stimulative e®ect
on consumption and hours worked. Overall, however, home welfare increases only about half
as much as it does in the CES economy.
Surprisingly, a fall in D¤ leads to a decline in foreign welfare. This decline mainly re°ects
international risk-sharing. In our economy, asset markets are complete so that ct = º0qtc¤
t where
º0 is a constant determined in the initial steady state. With complete asset markets, a fall in
D¤ induces relatively large increases in both c and q, and a foreign household is willing to
work harder without much compensation in terms of higher c¤. Of course, a foreign household
expects a domestic household to behave similarly following a fall in D as shown in the third
column of Table 8.
In response to the fall in D¤, foreign welfare is about 60 percent lower in the CES economy
than the SC economy. There are two channels a®ecting foreign welfare in opposite directions
that help explain this result. First, because pass-through is complete in the CES case, there is
a larger increase in import demand by domestic households than in the SC case. This larger
increase in demand induces a more pronounced rise in foreign hours worked and in turn tends
to lower welfare more in the CES economy. Second, there is an appreciation of the foreign
currency (see Table 7 for the SC case) that leads to higher foreign import demand. To the
29extent that pass-through is higher in the CES economy, foreign import demands expands more,
providing a bigger boost to overall consumption and welfare. The e®ect of the ¯rst channel
dominates the second channel in part because the foreign economy is relatively closed with an
import share of about 5 percent.
In general, the qualitative e®ects of a fall in D are similar to those for the decline in
D¤ except that the roles of the home and foreign economies are reversed. Note that there is
a larger fall in home welfare in the SC economy than in the CES economy in response to the
fall in D. This re°ects the increased relative importance of the second channel for the home
economy due to two factors. First, the larger size of the foreign economy leads to a greater
appreciation of the home currency. Second, the home economy is relatively more open so that
the appreciation provides a bigger boost to home import demand, aggregate consumption, and
welfare.
The fourth column of Table 8 combines the e®ects of lower trade costs in both markets
and demonstrates the importance of pass-through for the welfare bene¯ts of lower trade costs.
Although world welfare rises by nearly as much in the SC economy than the CES economy,
home welfare falls over 1 percent in the SC economy compared to a rise of 0.6 percent in the CES
economy. This fall in home welfare in the SC case in part re°ects that the fall in D has a larger
e®ect on demand for domestic exports, since the foreign economy is more than twice as large
as the home economy. Since it also is driven by our assumption of perfect risk-sharing between
foreign and domestic households, we consider an alternative with imperfect risk-sharing in our
sensitivity analysis.
We also consider the welfare e®ects of trade integration driven by an increase in foreign
productivity. As shown in the ¯fth column of Table 8, the increase in home welfare following
an improvement in foreign productivity is only somewhat smaller in the SC economy than the
CES economy. Although home consumption of imports, and in turn aggregate consumption,
does not rise as much in the low pass-through SC environment, this e®ect is secondary to the
large e±ciency gains of the foreign economy that a domestic household gets to share with its
foreign counterparts. Consequently, home welfare rises about 21.4 percent in the CES economy
30and only about 1.2 percentage points less in the SC economy.
With higher foreign productivity and lower trade costs, trade integration improves world
welfare by about 20 percent of steady state consumption in the CES economy and a little
more in the SC economy. Although the di®erence of the low or high pass-through environment
for world welfare is not large, the di®erence in terms of the welfare of the home country is
sizeable. The improvement in home welfare from trade integration is one-third lower in the low
pass-through SC environment than in the complete pass-through CES environment.
We emphasize that our goal in this section was simply to illustrate how incomplete
pass-through can alter the welfare bene¯ts of trade integration. In our model, trade occurs
solely along the intensive margin. Although a more realistic model for examining the welfare
bene¯ts of trade integration would also allow for an endogenous ¯rm entry and exit decision,
the incomplete pass-through associated with the strategic complementarity would likely have
important consequences for these models. In general, models that allow for an extensive trade
margin assume constant markups of prices over marginal costs and therefore pass-through
is complete.29 An important exception is the work of Ottaviano and Melitz (2005), which
studies the welfare bene¯ts of trade reforms when ¯rms face entry and exit decisions and have
variable markups.30 While they do not focus on the welfare di®erences of their variable markup
environment with a constant markup environment, their framework also implies that lower
trade costs lead to a rise in the markups of exporting ¯rms and to a fall in the markups of
domestic producers.
7.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We derived our main results by calibrating the fall in D and D¤ to be consistent with the
evidence of Baier and Bergstrand (2001) that falling trade costs accounted for one third of the
growth in world trade after World War II. In our alternative calibration, we choose the fall in D
29See, for instance, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), Melitz (2003), Ghironi and Melitz (2005),
Bergin and Glick (2005), and Choi and Alessandria (2005).
30As in our model, markups are variable because demand curves exhibit non-constant elasticity of substitution
between goods.
31and D¤ solely based on tari® data. In particular, we set the fall in D¤ to 2.7 percentage points,
which according to Table 2 is equivalent to the decline in average tari® rates in developed
countries since the late 1980s. For the decline in tari® in the rest of the world, we set the
fall in D to 5.6 percentage points by using U.S. export shares to average the tari® decline in
developing countries (11 percentage points) and in developed countries (2.7 percentage points)
presented in Tables 2 and 3.31 The top panel of Table 9 reports the results from this alternative
calibration. Abstracting from a rise in foreign productivity, we ¯nd that pass-through falls
5 percentage points in this alternative scenario, compared to almost 7 percentage points in
our benchmark calibration. When both trade costs decline and foreign productivity increases,
pass-through falls more than 12 percentage points, which accounts for almost 30 percent of the
decline in pass-through observed in the data.
Throughout our analysis, our calibration of steady-state markups also implied a rela-
tively high trade-price elasticity of imports. Since there is considerable uncertainty regarding
estimates of this elasticity, it is natural to consider whether lowering the trade-price elasticity
has a signi¯cant impact on our results. To do this while roughly preserving the same level of
























+ 1 = 1: (27)
Note that setting ½ = 1 yields our benchmark demand aggregator. In our alternative calibration,
we set ½ and ° so that the elasticity of aggregate imports with respect to the relative import
price is 6.5 (compared to 10.7 in the SC calibration) and the level of the steady-state markup
of the foreign exporter is 13.5% (compared to 10.2% in the SC calibration). As before, we set
´ based on the observed value of ¯pm;q in the pre-1990 period.32
Results from this alternative are reported in Table 9 under the label \Lower Elastic-
ity Calibration". Our ¯rst experiment shows that when the fall in trade costs remains at 7
31We used a weight of 65% for industrial countries based on 1992 data from the IFS DOTS database.
32We set ½ = 0:97, ´ = ¡2:32, ° = 1:135, and ! = !¤ = 0:1281. As in the SC calibration, we set
¾z = ¾¤
z = 0:0113 and ¾D = ¾¤
D = 0:0034 in order to match the volatility of output and the correlation of the
real exchange rate and the relative import price. We also used the same parameter values given in Table 4.
32percentage points and the level of foreign productivity is 30 percent higher than in the initial
steady state, the fall in pass-through is a bit larger than in the SC calibration. Not surprisingly,
with a lower elasticity the model has more di±culty accounting for the 5 percentage point rise
in the U.S. import share that has occurred over the last twenty ¯ve years: the overall trade
share rises only 2.4 percentage points in this case compared to 4.2 percentage points in the SC
calibration. Thus, our model is no di®erent than other international real business cycle models
in that it needs a counterfactually high trade price elasticity to account for the growth in U.S.
trade experienced over the last twenty-¯ve years.33
Table 9 also reports the e®ects of calibrating the trade costs so that trade costs account
for 1/3 of the observed 5 percentage point increase in the U.S. trade share. In this case, D and
D¤ fall by 15 percentage points and pass-through falls by about 24 percentage points.
Our results so far have been derived under the assumption of complete international risk-
sharing. Table 10 displays the e®ects of lower trade costs and higher foreign productivity on
pass-through and welfare when asset markets are incomplete internationally but complete at
the national level. In this case, there is a single, internationally-traded asset that is non-state
contingent. We also assume that there is a small \portfolio adjustment cost" associated with
purchases/sales of this international asset so that the level of net foreign assets in a country is
stationary.34
As shown in Table 10, a decrease in D and D¤ of 7 percentage points results in ¯pm;q
falling 10 percentage points, compared to 7 percentage points in the complete asset market case.
The larger increase in the incomplete market economy re°ects that the larger appreciation of
the home currency and thus a larger decline in foreign export costs (denominated in home
currency) in response to a decline in D. This larger appreciation occurs because a fall in D
does not stimulate domestic production as much as in the complete market economy in which
a household is willing to work more due to risk-sharing considerations.
33See Yi (2003) for an extended discussion of this point.
34Speci¯cally, we assume that a household pays a quadratic adjustment cost,
³
2(bft+1)2 for changing its level
of the international asset, bft+1. For the experiments reported in Table 10, we set ³ = 1e¡05. See Schmitt-Groh¶ e
and Uribe (2001) for a comparison of this way of imposing stationarity with other alternatives.
33In contrast, there is a much smaller increase in ¯pm;q following the rise in foreign technol-
ogy in the incomplete market economy than in the complete market economy. In the incomplete
market case, foreign export costs denominated in home currency do not fall as sharply, limiting
the associated increase in the markup of a foreign exporter. This smaller rise in costs re°ects
a more subdued appreciation of the home currency.
Table 10 also displays the welfare bene¯ts from trade integration under incomplete mar-
kets. Similar to the complete market case, the bene¯ts of trade integration are signi¯cantly
reduced in the SC economy relative to the CES economy. Home welfare rises about 1 percent
in the CES economy in response to both a fall in trade costs and a rise in foreign technology
compared to only 0.3 percent in the SC economy.
While the welfare bene¯ts of trade integration to the home economy are much lower in
the SC economy than in the CES economy regardless of the asset market structure, there is a
considerable di®erence in the home welfare gains in the SC economy depending on the asset
market assumption. A fall in trade costs results in an increase in home welfare under the
incomplete markets, while home welfare declines in the complete markets economy. Also, a fall
in foreign technology results in a slight fall in home welfare in the incomplete market economy
compared to a substantial increase in the complete market economy. This fall in home welfare
in the incomplete market case re°ects an increase in hours worked induced by a fall in the
domestic markups of home ¯rms. Furthermore, home consumption no longer rises much when
risk-sharing is limited.
Overall, our sensitivity analysis supports our main ¯nding that increased trade integration
has been an important factor behind the decline in pass-through. A fall in trade costs induces
a substantial decline in pass-through both in a version of our model with a lower trade-price
elasticity and in a version in which asset markets are incomplete. In contrast, the fall in pass-
through resulting from higher foreign productivity is sensitive to the asset market assumption, as
the decline in pass-through is much greater in the case of complete asset markets. Our analysis
also shows that low pass-through alters the welfare bene¯ts of trade integration regardless of
the asset market structure.
348 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new explanation for the decline in pass-through that emphasized
the role of trade integration and strategic complementarity. When ¯rms face strategic comple-
mentarity in setting prices, a fall in exporters' marginal costs, driven by trade integration, leads
to lower pass-through. This e®ect is quantitatively important since a fall in trade costs leads
to roughly a one-for-one reduction in pass-through in our benchmark calibration and accounts
for roughly 40 percent of the observed decline in pass-through since the early 1990s.
We also showed that pass-through is an important factor for the welfare bene¯ts of
trade integration. Because foreign exporters raise their markups and pass-through less of the
reduction in their costs to domestic households, the welfare bene¯ts of trade integration can be
substantially reduced relative to an environment with complete pass-through.
In our analysis, we chose to model strategic complementarity via monopolistic competi-
tion and non-CES demand curves. Although this approach broadly captures the complementar-
ity in price setting by ¯rms in a tractable manner, directly modelling the strategic interaction
amongst ¯rms in a richer, game-theoretic framework may yield additional insights. Finally, in
our environment, the impact of trade integration on pass-through and welfare occurred solely
along the intensive margin. An important extension is to investigate the entry and exit de-
cision of ¯rms into the export market, especially since our model requires a high elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign goods to match the observed rise in U.S. trade shares.
We leave these extensions for future research.
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39Table 1: Volatility and Correlation of Relative Import Price and Real Exchange Ratea
Moment (Di®erenced) Full Sample 1980:1-1989:4 1990:1-2004:4
a. ¯pm;q 0.35 0.55 0.13
(a = b*c)
b. ¾pm=¾q 0.47 0.60 0.25
c. corr(q;pm) 0.75 0.92 0.51
Moment (HP-Filtered)
a. ¯pm;q 0.46 0.59 0.17
(a = b*c)
b. ¾pm=¾q 0.54 0.61 0.29
c. corr(q;pm) 0.85 0.95 0.60
a¯pm;q denotes the regression coe±cient from a univariate least squares regression of the real exchange rate on
the relative import price. Di®erenced refers to data that has been log-di®erenced. HP-¯ltered series were
computed by transforming the log of the variables (with ¸ = 1600).
40Table 2: Weighted-Average Tari®s on Products in Developing Countriesa
Decline from
Region 1984-1987 1988-1990 2000-01 1984-2001b
Developing Countries 22.2 17.9 11 11.2
Asiac 20.9 17.1 9.7 11.2
South America 36.4 24.9 11.2 23.2
aWeighted-average tari®s are calculated as simple averages across product categories, weighting by each
country's import share. Source: Unctad (http://globstat.unctad.org/html/index.html).
bDecline refers to the di®erence between columns 2 and 4.
cAsia including Japan.
Table 3: Weighted-Average Tari®s on Products in Developed Countriesa
Tari®s on Decline from
Products from: 1989-1992 1996 2001 1989-2001b
Developing Countries 7.2 4.9 3.9 3.3
Asiac 7.8 4.8 3.9 3.7
Developed Countries 5.1 3.5 2.5 2.6
World 5.8 4.0 3.1 2.7
aWeighted-average tari®s are calculated as simple averages across non-fuel and non-agricultural products,
weighting by each country's import share. Source: Unctad (http://globstat.unctad.org/html/index.html).
bDecline refers to the di®erence between columns 2 and 4.
cAsia including Japan.
41Table 4: Common Parameter Values Across Calibrations
n = 2.8 Z = 1
¯ = (1:03)¡0:25 Â = 1:5
½Z = ½¤
Z = 0:95 ½D = ½¤
D = 0:95
Table 5: Additional Parameter Values and Properties of Calibrated Models
NCES Demand
SC Calibration 2004 SC Calibration CES Calibration
´ -1.87 -1.87 0
° 1.15 1.15 1/1.024
D = D¤ 1.25 1.19 1.25
Z¤ 0.7143 0.9289 0.7143
! = !¤ 0.15 0.15 0.68
Â0 0.83 0.83 0.91
Â¤
0 0.80 0.80 0.91
¾Z = ¾¤
Z 0.01075 0.01075 0.0103
¾D = ¾¤
D 0.0024 0.0024 0.0021
Home Trade Share 9.9% 14.2% 9.9%
Home Firms' Domestic Markup (¹d) 1.22 1.19 1.1024
Foreign Exporters' Markup (¹m) 1.1024 1.26 1.1024
Direct Pass-Through (·m) 0.36 0.25 1
42Table 6: Selected Moments and Parameter Values of Calibrated Modelsa
Data Model
Moment 1980-1989 1990-2004 SC CES
Calibration Calibration
a. cov(¢q;¢pm)=var(¢q) 0.55 0.13 0.55 1
(a = b*c)
b. ¾(¢pm)=¾(¢q) 0.60 0.25 0.60 1.09
c. corr(¢q;¢pm) 0.92 0.51 0.92 0.92
¾(yhp) 1.74 0.98 1.74 1.74
¾(qhp) 4.98 2.70 0.60 0.61
¾(¢q) 2.89 1.45 0.47 0.49
corr(yhp;y
hp
¡1) 0.90 0.88 0.71 0.71
corr(qhp;q
hp





m;¡1) 0.92 0.92 0.66 0.64
aThe subscript `hp' denotes that a variable was transformed using the HP-¯lter (with ¸ = 1600).
43Table 7: The E®ect of Lower Trade Costs and Higher Foreign Productivitya;b
Higher Z¤
Lower D¤ Lower D Lower D¤;D Higher Z¤ Lower D¤, D
Foreign Exporter Trade Cost (D¤) -7 0 -7 0 -7
Home Exporter Trade Cost (D) 0 -7 -7 0 -7
Foreign Productivity (Z¤) 0 0 0 30 30
Home Trade Share 1.3 0.5 1.7 3.0 4.2
Home Firm Markup at Home (¹d) -0.8 -0.3 -1.0 -1.8 -2.5
a. Home Import Price (pm) -1.6 -0.6 -2.1 -3.9 -5.8
(a = b+c)
b. Foreign Firm Markup at Home (¹m) 2.8 1.0 3.8 7.8 13.2
c. Foreign Marginal Cost (qD¤Ã¤) -4.3 -1.5 -5.9 -11.7 -19.0
Real Exchange Rate (q) 1.3 -2.6 -1.3 -6.6 -9.7
Direct Pass-Through (·m) -2.8 -1.0 -3.8 -7.1 -10.8
Pass-Through (¯pm;q) -5.5 -3.7 -6.9 -9.1 -15.8
aEntry refers to the log-di®erence for a variable with the exceptions of the trade costs, home trade share, ·m,
and ¯pm;q. For these variables, the entries refer to the percentage point di®erence from its initial steady state
value. For the increase in Z¤, we report the arithmetic percentage change instead of the log-di®erence.
bRow a equals row b plus row c with any discrepancy due to rounding.
44Table 8: The Welfare E®ects of Lower Trade Costs and Higher Foreign Productivitya;b
Higher Z¤
Lower D¤ Lower D Lower D¤;D Higher Z¤ Lower D¤, D
Foreign Exporter Trade Cost (D¤) -7 0 -7 0 -7
Home Exporter Trade Cost (D) 0 -7 -7 0 -7
Foreign Productivity (Z¤) 0 0 0 30 30
SC Calibration:
Home Welfare 1.18 -2.26 -1.12 20.17 16.81
Foreign Welfare -0.35 1.36 1.04 20.47 22.36
World Welfare 0.05 0.40 0.48 20.39 20.90
CES Calibration:
Home Welfare 2.48 -1.87 0.61 21.40 25.35
Foreign Welfare -0.91 1.34 0.46 19.02 18.14
World Welfare -0.02 0.50 0.50 19.65 20.04
aChange in steady state calculated in consumption equivalent units.
bWorld welfare is calculated by weighting home and foreign welfare using the population sizes of the two
economies.
Table 9: The Decline in Pass-Through For Alternative Calibrationsa
Foreign Exporter Home Exporter Foreign Home
Trade Cost (D¤) Trade Cost (D) Productivity (Z¤) Trade Share ¯pm;q
SC Calibration
Tari® Data Only -2.7 -5 0 0.9 -5.0
Tari® Data Only, Higher Z¤ -2.7 -5 30 3.6 -12.4
Lower Elasticity Calibration
¢D = ¢D¤ = ¡7, Higher Z¤ -7 -7 30 2.4 -18.3
¢D = ¢D¤ = ¡17, Higher Z¤ -15 -15 30 2.9 -24.4
aEntry refers to the percentage point di®erence between a variable and its initial steady state value.
45Table 10: The Decline in Pass-Through and Welfare Bene¯ts Under Incomplete Marketsa;b
Higher Z¤
Lower D¤ Lower D Lower D¤;D Higher Z¤ Lower D¤, D
Foreign Exporter Trade Cost (D¤) -7 0 -7 0 -7
Home Exporter Trade Cost (D) 0 -7 -7 0 -7
Foreign Productivity (Z¤) 0 0 0 30 30
SC Calibration:
Real Exchange Rate (q) 1.7 -3.7 -2.1 -1.1 -3.8
Pass-Through (¯pm;q) -5.3 -4.9 -9.8 -1.90 -11.6
Home Welfare 0.15 0.16 0.34 -0.04 0.30
Foreign Welfare 0.14 0.13 0.31 30.11 30.47
World Welfare 0.14 0.14 0.32 22.17 22.53
CES Calibration:
Home Welfare 0.35 0.31 0.77 0.15 1.03
Foreign Welfare 0.15 0.17 0.37 29.96 30.38
World Welfare 0.21 0.21 0.48 22.11 22.65
aEntries for change in trade costs and ¯pm;q refer to percentage point change from initial steady state values.
Entries for change in q and Z¤ refer to percent change. Change in steady state welfare calculated in
consumption equivalent units.
bWorld welfare is calculated by weighting home and foreign welfare using the population sizes of the two
economies.
46Figure 1: The Real Exchange Rate and Relative Import Prices
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Figure 2c: Trade Cost and Pass−through
































Figure 2b: Average Trade Cost
48Figure 3: Growth in GDP per Employee in the United States and the Rest of the World
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49Figure 4: Import Demand and an Exporter's Marginal Revenue Schedule
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